The impact of federalism on the healthcare system in terms of efficiency, equity, and cost containment: the case of Switzerland.
According to the economic theory of federalism (Oates 1999), a decentralized decision to collectively fund and supply the quantity and quality of public services will increase economic welfare as long as three conditions are fulfilled: preferences and production costs of the different local constituencies are heterogeneous; local governments are better informed than the central agency because of their proximity to the citizens; and the competition between local governments exerts a significant impact on the performance of the local administration and on the ability of public agencies to implement policy innovation. Federalism also presents some negative aspects, including the opportunity costs of decentralization, which materialize in terms of unexploited economies of scale; the emergence of spillover effects among jurisdictions; and the risk of cost-shifting exercises from one layer of the government to the other. Finally, competition between fiscal regimes can affect the level of equity. The literature considers fiscal federalism as a mechanism for controlling the size of the public sector and for constraining the development of redistributive measures. The present paper reviews the impact that federalism has on the efficiency, equity, and cost containment of the healthcare system in Switzerland, a country with a strongly decentralized political system that is based on federalism and the institutions of direct democracy, a liberal economic culture, and a well-developed tradition of mutualism and social security (generous social expenditure and welfare system). By analyzing the empirical evidence available for Switzerland, we expect to draw some general policy lessons that might also be useful for other countries.